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J I JRiSDK ""["JOIN iW AIM'KLLATU C O U R T 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal 
under I Jtah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) and pursuant an Order of the I Itah Supreme Court 
entered! Jclober i, liiW1^ 
ISSl JES P R E S E N T E D F O R R E V IK W 
I. Did the Trial Court Correct!) Rule that McQueen Cannot Reoo\tT AHorne) 
Fees Under the Promissory Notes or the Trust Deed? 
Standard 01 ive\ie^ , . * , - . , » 
question ol" law which ihn « ouri reviews loi correctness. Cttfe Rio I/u. et m. v. Larkin-
Giffbrd-Overton, LLC, 2009 I IT 27, \1 \, 20" I1 u! i 2 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below h\ N K UIK en s Motion 
v ai d of ( \ tt 3i i icy Fees ai id Expei ises dated Novel t: lbei 3 2008, 
However, McQueen now claims attorney fees based 'upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-5-82<>. which was not preserved below 
II. Did the Trial Court Correctly Rule that McQueen Cannot Reco\ er Attorney 
Fees Against the Guarantors of the Promissory Notes? 
Standaa* -.«* \w s tew i 1 1: ic ti la.! coi irt's interpret;!^ J. -n a contract presents a 
questioi- oflau which this l ourt rc\ic\\s lor correctness. Cafe Rio, hie, et ai v Larkin-
Giffora (h\rh>>> < * . = "!l- •- \ r .* . •• ,\ ••: . 
Pi eservation Below .:; 1 1 lis issi K w aspreserv edbelo\ v i;i:i]\ 1c Qi i i en' sl\ loti :»ii 
for Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors dated December 19, 2008. 
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IIL Did the Trial Court Make the Requisite Finding to Support an Award of 
Discovery Sanctions? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the legal sufficiency of factual 
findings . . . under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the 
trial court." Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^ [14, 217 P.3d 733. 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below by PC Crane's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions dated July 28, 
2008. 
IV. Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion with Regard to the Amount of 
Discovery Sanctions Awarded Against PC Crane? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the award of discovery sanctions 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Bodell Construction Co. v. Robbins, et aL, 2009 
UT52,^jl6,215P.3d933. 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below by McQueen's Second 
Motion for Sanctions dated June 24,2008, and by PC Crane's Memorandum in Opposition to 
that Motion dated July 28, 2008. 
V. Was the Amount of the Trial Court's Award of Costs to McQueen Proper? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to award 
costs to the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard. Jensen v. Sawyers, et aL, 
2005 UT 81,1J140, 130 P.3d 325. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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P r e s e r v a t i o n Be low: I t ' ("lane preserved Ihis issue helmv h\ ils < ^huxiu HI lo 
V< idli* u I Mr A • anduin of Costs dated Jul} 6 ,2009 and a Reply Memorandum L Support of 
the Objection a u e d August 7, 2009. 
N S T I T U T I O N A L IJRO\'1S1CHNS, S'l 'A'I'U'l 'KS, UR1)INAIN( T'N 
mstiti itional, stati itor> „ or other provisions are determinative or of central 
importance to this appeal. 
S 1 A 1 E M E N T Q F T H E C A S E • 
• . A . IN ill HIlii-i ill IIIIIii" l 'use. 
This was a breach of contract case arising from two transactions for the sale of 
construction cranes, related equipment and goodwill . The parties entered contracts in 2004 
and :uu> as I L ** ; i i \ .; ... m.*;.. J ^ . K . z f iled si lit in l tl tc: Disti lot. Coi irt in 
v ,^r-.. -»• "• - '•••;. !•!*• :? * - Tesentation, ai id other causes of action. 
1 he causes o i action oubuniiwd iu the j ur) w a c . ( i ; breach of contract relating to each of the 
* * • • purchase agreements identified below, and (2) misrepresentation in the formation of each 
oi ic: (R 3316- 3320) 
Hie issues in this appeal and cross-appeal lelatc iuiuhn:.w made I the District 
Court after trial and are not based upon any rulings m<tde before or during tna »>t upon the 
jury's verdict 
1
 McQueen regular!;)/ contends 1 i e \ \ as si led foi frai id I "''C Ci at ic i lever asserted ai ry cai iseol * 
.'ii'iioii lor fraud 
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B, Course of Proceedings. 
The case went to trial in October 2008. The jury found in favor of McQueen 
on all of PC Crane's claims. Afterward McQueen sought and obtained the recusal of the 
Honorable L.A. Dever who had presided over the case from the beginning. The Honorable 
Robin W. Reese was then assigned to the case. McQueen then pursued his Motions for 
Attorney Fees and a ruling on two pending discovery Motions that had been filed but not 
ruled upon before trial. 
C. Disposition Below. 
McQueen sought a ruling on four Motions which were heard by Judge Reese 
on March 31, 2009. In chronological order of filing the Motions were: 
a. Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions, dated June 24,2008. 
(R. 2218-2219)2 
b. Defendants' Motion for Award of and Determination of the 
Amount of Attorney' s Fees to be Awarded to McQueen in Connection with Discovery 
Motions, dated June 27, 2008. (R. 2359-2380) 
c. Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses, 
dated November 3, 2008. (R. 3477-3514) 
d. Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney' s Fees and Expenses 
Against Guarantors, dated December 19, 2008. (R. 3842-3849) 
2
 The record indicates this Motion is missing from the District Court's file. (See 
R. 2218-2219) Copies of the Motion and the supporting Memorandum are attached as 
Addendum 1 for the convenience of the Court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 lu I)I"IMI'| Coiul ikiiiat the l'»'l ln<» M' 'linn-. In Killing enlnrd April 15, 
1 :
' H)4-3y 1 Oj It denied the second Motion and granted the first in a Ruling entered 
April 29? 2009, -> ^911-3915) Both Ralings \\ ere memorialized in an Order on 
Outstanding Motions entered June 2 \ 31111'"' |R, ^).^ i wi.0) I lie Disinci < HUM entered 
lm;il liidgincnl nn Angus.! JI 'III!' «!•! W71 V)7<» 'IhuvafU'i !V1k t hiren 11 led his Notice 
of Appeal and PC Crane filed its Notice of Cross™Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FA( t s 
A, Sales << <*.• 
1. agreement dated October 18,2004, McQueen agreed to sell three 
cranes to PC Crane and k Jelivu the goodwill associated with them. The agreement 
contains no provision for attorney foes, (R 3.580-3595) 
2. 
K ^ ^in!vr "* *uu/. iiic Oidci did not create a right to attorney lees.
 VK. , . ^ . .33) 
3. In another agreement dated March 2 1 2005. \k Queen agreed to sell n 
fourth crane and to deliver the goou,• •: in,.,ia;vM .. - , nai agreement ilso does nnl 
pi: o\ ide for attorney fees (R 3597 3605) II lesetw oc c fill act s are collectrv e!>< referred to as 
the "Purchase Agreements." 
4. PC Crane brought suit alleging McQueen failed to deliver goodwill as 
required b> the Purchase Agreements, ai id to recovei as dan lages tt le good^v > > ill payi i lei its 
MKule I i M» < hit HI luidt i tin1 Puiehiisr \ puvtiients. 
5 
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5. The vast majority of the amounts due under the Purchase Agreements 
was paid to McQueen by Zions Bank and Jordan Federal Credit Union from loans issued to 
PC Crane. Plaintiffs also signed separate promissory notes with McQueen to pay for part of 
the equipment and for goodwill. 
6. The two promissory notes relevant to this Motion are as follows: 
a. Promissory Note dated October 18, 2004 in the amount of 
$228,800 (the "$228,800 Note"). (R. 3607-3609) 
b. Promissory Note dated March 21, 2005 in the amount of 
$177,600 (the "$177,600 Note"). (R. 3611-3615) 
7. The $228,000 Note and the $ 177,600 Note are collectively referred to as 
the "Promissory Notes." The Promissory Notes each have a limited attorney fee clause. 
8. PC Crane also signed a Security Agreement dated March 21,2005. The 
Security Agreement does not provide for attorney fees. (R. 3617-3620) 
9. Plaintiff Lacy, LLC ("Lacy") also signed a Deed of Trust on April 15, 
2005 (the "Trust Deed") as security for the Promissory Notes. The Trust Deed has a limited 
attorney fee clause. (R. 3622-3627) 
10. The only claims submitted to the jury were based upon the Purchase 
Agreements. (R. 3316-3320) 
B. Promissory Notes, Default Provisions. 
11. McQueen relies almost exclusively on the Promissory Notes for his 
attorney fees claim. (R. 3477-3514) 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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12. The Promissory Notes each have nearly identical language requiring 
both: (a) a "default" and (b) an enforcement action, as conditions to any right to claim 
attorney fees. 
13. The term "default" is defined in each of the Promissory Notes with five 
possible events of default being enumerated in paragraphs 2.1 through 2.5 as follows: 
a. Paragraph 2.1 - default occurs if PC Crane "fails to make any 
payment under this Promissory Note on the date due of such payment." 
b. Paragraph 2.2 - default occurs if PC Crane "becomes insolvent 
[or] a receiver is appointed," "makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors," files 
a "voluntary petition in bankruptcy," or is "the subject of an involuntary petition in 
bankruptcy." 
c. Paragraph 2.3 - default occurs if a payment default happens 
under any other promissory note. 
d. Paragraph 2.4 - default occurs if a default happens with respect 
to the Trust Deed. 
e. Paragraph 2.5 - default occurs if a default happens under the 
Security Agreement. 
(R. 3607-3608, 3611-3612) 
14. Paragraph 3 titled "Remedies" in each of the Promissory Notes then 
states as follows: "In the event of a default under the Promissory Note, Holder [s], at its 
7 
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[their] option, may take one or more of the following actions" to enforce the Promissory 
Note. (R. 3608, 3612 (emphasis added)) 
15. The possible enforcement actions are described in paragraph 3.1 titled 
"Acceleration and Legal Action." It provides as follows: 
Declare the entire unpaid principal balance of the debt 
evidenced hereby, and all interest on such debt and all other 
costs and expenses evidenced hereby, to be immediately due and 
payable, notwithstanding any other provision hereof, and 
commence legal action for collection and enforcement of the 
Promissory Note, including all costs and reasonable attorneys 
fees incurred in connection therewith. 
(R. 3608, 3612 (emphasis added)) Thus, McQueen may only claim attorney fees as part of 
such an enforcement action. 
C. No Event of Default Occurred. 
16. PC Crane was never in default under either of the Promissory Notes. As 
described below, PC Crane fully paid McQueen all principal and interest due under the 
Promissory Notes in accordance with the parties' Stipulation and the Orders of the District 
Court. 
17. The $228,800 Note required monthly payments through September 30, 
2007 and then a lump sum due on October 30, 2007. (R. 3607-3609) The $177,600 Note 
required monthly payments through March 1, 2008 with a lump sum due on April 1, 2008. 
(R. 3611-3615) 
18. The parties signed a Stipulation on November 26, 2007 which was 
approved by the Court in an Order entered November 30, 2007. The Stipulation 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
acknowledges that the only payment left under the $228,800 Note was the lump sum payment 
due on October 30, 2007. (R. 3629-3632) 
19. McQueen's counsel agreed to the Stipulation in principle before 
October 30, 2007, but the written form was not signed until November. (R. 3629-3632) 
20. The Stipulation then states that none of the Plaintiffs "shall be required 
to make any further payments on the $228,800 Note prior to the entry of a final judgment in 
the above-captioned case." (R. 3630) 
21. The Stipulation also provides that PC Crane would continue to make 
monthly payments under the $177,600 Note through March 2008, but that none of the 
"Plaintiffs shall be required to make any payments other than said prescribed monthly 
payments on the $177,600 Note until the entry of a final judgment in the above-captioned 
case." (R. 3630-3631) 
22. PC Crane timely made all monthly payments required by each of the 
Promissory Notes and by the Stipulation and Order of November 2007. (R. 2357) 
23. McQueen did not contend otherwise, and instead argued that filing the 
action below was a default under the Promissory Notes: "This action does not differ in 
substance from a suit to enforce the Notes by McQueen with the plaintiffs defending based 
on a failure of consideration - the parties are merely reversed ...." (R. 3483) 
24. By the Stipulation, the Defendants also agreed not to declare a default or 
take any other action to enforce the Promissory Notes until a final judgment is entered. The 
Stipulation reads as follows: 
9 
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Defendants agree to stay any action to foreclose, enforce, 
collect, or otherwise declare the Plaintiffs or Lacy Limited 
Liability Company in default of their obligations under the 
$228,800 Note and the $177,600 Note, including recording any 
notice of default, reporting any default to any credit agency, or 
taking any other action under either Note prior to the entry of a 
final judgment in the aboye-captioned case .... 
(R. 3631 (emphasis added)) 
25. The Order approves the Stipulation in all respects and also prohibits the 
Defendants from taking "any action to foreclose, enforce, collect, or otherwise declare the 
Plaintiffs or Lacy Limited Liability Company in default of their obligations under the 
$228,800 Note and the $177,600 Note .,.." (R. 3635-3636 (emphasis added)) 
26. The record reflects that no default occurred under any other provision of 
either of the Promissory Notes, and McQueen does not contend that any other kind of default 
occurred. (R. 3477-3514; Brief of Appellants at 42-49.) 
27. McQueen did not serve a notice of default or declare the unpaid 
principal balance due and payable under either of the Promissory Notes. (R. 2357) 
D. No Enforcement Action Taken. 
28. McQueen also did not commence any legal action to enforce either of 
the Promissory Notes or to recover costs and attorney fees. McQueen's Counterclaim only 
sought reformation of the Purchase Agreement dated October 18, 2004, which claim was 
fully satisfied by the Court's Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment entered 
November 2, 2007. (R. 3580-95) 
29. The Counterclaim asserted no other cause of action. (R. 106-110) 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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30. McQueen filed no other legal action and did not pursue any other right 
or remedy in connection with either of the Promissory Notes, 
E, Court's Order, Promissory Notes Paid Off. 
31. The Promissory Notes were paid off pursuant to an Order of the District 
Court. In a series of events only summarized here, PC Crane had to seek an Order allowing it 
to pay off the Promissory Notes and to obtain a release of the Trust Deed. McQueen 
contested the payoff before the District Court and further challenged it by Petition to the Utah 
Supreme Court. (R. 2812-2813) 
32. PC Crane then paid the balance of the $228,800 Note with a check dated 
August 27, 2008 in the amount of $133,666.87. (R. 3647) McQueen Crane Services, LLC 
accepted and cashed the check. 
33. On the same day PC Crane paid the balance of the $ 177,600 Note with a 
check for $159,352.48. (R. 3648) McQueen Masonry, Inc. accepted and cashed the check. 
34. At trial, James L. McQueen testified he had been paid in full for all 
principal and interest due under the Promissory Notes. He further testified PC Crane had 
made all payments in accordance with the Promissory Notes, the Stipulation, and the Court's 
Order. 
35. The Promissory Notes were not the subject of this litigation. The 
Complaint alleged McQueen failed to deliver goodwill as promised in the Purchase 
Agreements dated October 18, 2004 and March 21, 2005, and sought a judgment requiring 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the return of all goodwill payments with interest. (R. 12-14, 20-24) No cause of action 
challenged the validity of the Promissory Notes. (R. 1-25) 
36. The only claims submitted to the jury were breach of contract as to the 
Purchase Agreements and material misrepresentation in the formation of the Purchase 
Agreements. No issue was submitted to the jury concerning either of the Promissory Notes. 
(R. 3650-3654) 
37. As to each Purchase Agreement the jury found PC Crane had fully 
performed all of its obligations. (R. 3651-3652) 
F, Discovery Regarding Trailer Modifications. 
38. McQueen sought overly broad discovery about trailer modifications in 
an attempt to show that PC Crane had dealings with a crane broker named Lon Stam 
("Stam") earlier than alleged. 
39. McQueen believed PC Crane and its counsel were lying to the 
Defendants and to the Court. (Addendum 1, McQueen Memo at 8-9.) McQueen pursued 
extensive discovery in a tireless effort to prove his theory. 
40. Stam is a crane broker in Utah who worked with McQueen for several 
years before the Purchase Agreements were signed. Nearly all of the customers who rented 
McQueen's cranes had a long business relationship with Stam, but hardly knew McQueen. 
The goodwill McQueen agreed to deliver consisted mainly of those customer relationships. 
3
 PC Crane had good reason to be concerned about too much documentation being produced 
to McQueen who remained a potential competitor in the crane rental business. (R. 4002, 
T. 39-40) 
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PC Crane alleged that Stam, not McQueen, had those business relationships, and that 
McQueen withheld that information when the Purchase Agreements were signed. 
41. PC Crane representatives testified they did not learn about Stam's 
relationship with the McQueen customers until shortly after the second Purchase Agreement 
was signed in March 2005. (See R. 2423) 
42. In a loan application to the Bank of American Fork over a year later in 
April 2006, PC Crane said it "collaborated" with Stam "in the building of a custom designed 
trailer" to be used with a crane known as the "300." (R. 2464-2469) 
43. McQueen contended this "custom designed trailer" is the same one PC 
Crane modified in March 2005, referred to as the Fontaine. (Addendum 1, McQueen Memo 
at 7.) The record shows they cannot be the same trailer. 
G. The Fontaine Trailer. 
44. Cranes must be used with counter weights and one or more semi-trailers 
are needed to carry the counter weights to a job site. (R. 2415) 
45. One of the cranes bought from McQueen in 2004 was known as the 
"165." (R. 2471) However, PC Crane did not buy McQueen's semi-trailer for the 165. 
(R. 2415) 
46. Instead PC Crane bought a 1996 Fontaine trailer (the "Fontaine") on 
March 9, 2005 to carry the 165 counter weights. (R. 2475, 2481) 
47. Vernon Belcher ("Vera") made some modifications to the Fontaine by 
adding a third axle, moving the other two axles, and making related changes. UDOT 
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representatives helped Vern design the modifications. No one else was involved. 
(R. 2475-2476) 
48. Vern then hired Precision Truck and Trailer Repair, Inc. in Salt Lake 
City to finish the modifications (R. 2477), and the work was completed on or about April 8, 
2005. (R. 2508-2509) 
49. Stam was not involved with the modifications to the Fontaine or any of 
the design work. (R. 2485-2486) 
50. Vern testified the reason for modifying the Fontaine was "exclusively" 
to carry the three counter weights for the 165. (R. 2476, 2505) Even after these 
modifications the Fontaine could carry no more than 51,000 pounds. (R. 2476) 
51. PC Crane also bought a crane from McQueen known as the "300" which 
requires four counter weights. The 300 is a much larger crane than the 165 and was also 
purchased in October 2004. (R. 2511) 
52. The Fontaine could carry the counter weights for the 165 but could not 
carry the counter weights for the 300 (R. 2488), which weigh about 69,000 pounds. 
(R.2502) 
53. Vern testified the 300 counter weights were "too much weight for the 
Fontaine." (R. 2476) Stam also testified "it's not possible to modify [the Fontaine] in such a 
way as to carry all three counterweights for the 300-ton." (R. 2488) 
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H. Collaborations About a Custom Designed Trailer. 
54. Paul Belcher ("Paul") testified he had discussions with Stam about 
"some way designing a trailer that would allow us to facilitate using a 300-ton as a smaller 
crane." (R. 2502) 
55. PC Crane had to "down rent" the 300 on several occasions, i.e. rent it 
for use as a smaller crane, so Paul was trying to find a way to "more cost effectively down 
rent it." PC Crane would need a single trailer that could haul the "three counter weights" for 
the 300 which "totaled out to 69,000 pounds ...." (R. 2502) 
56. Paul does not remember when those discussions took place, but the 
document referencing them was used with a loan application to the Bank of American Fork 
in April 2006. (R. 2357) 
5 7. The custom designed trailer mentioned in the loan application ultimately 
was never built. It "never became a feasible option" because as time passed PC Crane no 
longer needed to down rent the 300. (R. 2502, 2504) 
5 8. The loan was never issued because PC Crane found financing through a 
leasing company. (R. 2357) 
I. PC Crane's Discovery Responses and Communications. 
59. At a hearing before Judge Dever on March 4,2008, PC Crane stated the 
Fontaine was different from the "custom designed trailer." The transcript reads as follows: 
THE COURT: What about this Exhibit No. 3 and the one he just 
gave us today, which is PC-273, where it talks about this drop-deck 
trailer payment on March 29th? 
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MR. BARNECK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Isn't that something that shows that you were 
working on some sort of a trailer? 
MR. BARNECK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that the trailer [at] issue? 
MR. BARNECK: No. And if counsel had asked in depositions, they 
would have been told that Vern Belcher did this one on his own. PC 
Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to create one. 
This was for a different crane. It was for the 165 Liebherr. The one 
that Counsel's complaining about from the loan documents was for the 
300. Different crane. 
(R. 4002, T. 39) 
60. Judge Dever himself questioned the purpose of the additional discovery 
McQueen requested, and noted that the Fontaine is a different trailer from the "custom 
designed trailer" referenced in the document at issue. (R. 2463-2469) The Court asked 
McQueen's counsel: 
THE COURT: I guess the question is is [sic] that, if they produce to 
you the invoices or whatever it is for these repairs of [the Fontaine], 
which is not the trailer that's at issue, . . . and you want to have 
discovery about what? The [Fontaine] trailer that the invoices say was 
repaired, when we know that, according to what you have and the 
information you have, is not the trailer that's at issue here? 
(R. 4002, T. 73 (emphasis added)) 
61. The Fontaine was purchased and modified in March and April 2005. 
(R. 2475, 2481, 2508-2509) The "custom designed trailer" was an idea discussed later 
between Paul and Stam but ultimately was never built because it was no longer needed. 
(R. 2502-2504) 
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62. These facts support the statements of Mr. Burghardt at the September 5, 
2007 hearing that the "collaboration" was in 2006 (R. 2659-2660), which McQueen 
challenges as inaccurate. (R. 2812-2813; see Addendum 1.) 
J. Order in Limine Re: Trailer Evidence. 
63. Despite the extensive discovery about trailer collaborations and 
modifications, much of that information was inadmissible as evidence at trial. 
64. At the beginning of trial the District Court entered an Order on 
Plaintiffs5 Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Trailer Modifications. (R. 3269-3272) 
65. The admissible evidence was limited to (a) collaborations between PC 
Crane and Lon Stam relating to the modification of a trailer, and (b) the loan application 
document if relevant to challenge witness credibility. (R. 3270) 
K. District Court's Finding. 
66. In its Ruling on McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, the District 
Court made the following finding: 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs position on March 26, 
2008, that the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with 
Plaintiffs5 previous position that the trailer had existed, there 
was just no documentation regarding the trailer. Based upon the 
inconsistency of Plaintiffs position, the Court holds that 
sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions. 
(R. 3913-3914 (emphasis added)) 
67. Neither the Court's Ruling entered April 29,2009 nor its Order entered 
June 23, 2009 made a finding that PC Crane acted willfully or in bad faith, was at fault, or 
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acted with persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. (R. 3911-3915, 
3933-3936) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
McQueen is not entitled to attorney fees under the Promissory Notes, either 
against the obligors or the guarantors. Attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by 
statute or contract, and are allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract. 
The attorney fee provisions in the Promissory Notes require both (a) a default by PC Crane 
and (b) an enforcement action by McQueen. The term "default" is defined in detail in the 
Promissory Notes, and the District Court correctly found PC Crane did not default under 
either of the Notes. Moreover, it is clear that McQueen did not take any enforcement action 
against PC Crane, and could not do so because of the Stipulation and Order of November 
2007. 
The Purchase Agreements were the subj ect of PC Crane's claims in the District 
Court and neither one contains an attorney fee clause. McQueen tries to characterize the case 
as a challenge to the Promissory Notes, to support his claim for attorney fees. However, the 
Promissory Notes are separate agreements and the fee provisions in the Notes cannot apply to 
an action claiming breach of the Purchase Agreements. Moreover, even if attorney fee 
provisions could be effectively transferred from one contract to another, the jury found that 
PC Crane fully complied with all of its obligations under the Purchase Agreements. 
This Court should also reject McQueen's claim for attorney fees under the 
Trust Deed and on other common law grounds, for the reasons set forth in the Rulings of the 
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District Court. McQueen also raises a new issue on this appeal claiming attorney fees under 
Utah's reciprocal statute at Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. McQueen did not properly 
preserve this issue for appeal. Moreover, the claim fails on the merits because the only 
contractual attorney fee provisions in the case are in favor of McQueen, not PC Crane. 
The District Court incorrectly based its sanctions award on the finding of 
"inconsistent" positions by PC Crane during discovery. A mere inconsistency is insufficient 
to support an award of discovery sanctions, and Utah law plainly requires a finding of 
willfulness, bad faith, persistent dilatory tactics, or other intentional fault. The District Court 
made no such finding, nor was there a basis for one, and the award of sanctions should be 
reversed. 
Alternatively, the small amount awarded by the District Court should be 
affirmed. Judge Reese made clear that he intended the scope of the award to be very limited. 
The District Court is granted a great deal of deference in determining the amount of a 
sanctions award, and McQueen has failed to show a clear abuse of discretion. 
Finally, the District Court's award of costs should be reduced by eliminating 
the expenses for depositions not used in any meaningful way at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
McQueen appeals the District Court's denial of his motion for attorney fees by 
challenging the interpretation of contracts between the parties, including the Promissory 
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Notes, the Trust Deed, and the Purchase Agreements. The standard of review for this part of 
McQueen's appeal is correctness under which the Court gives no deference to the trial 
court's interpretation. Cafe Rio, Inc., et al v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, 
<[|21, 207 P.3d 1235. McQueen also challenges the District Court's rejection of his claim for 
attorney fees against the guarantors of the Promissory Notes. This argument challenges the 
interpretation of the same contracts as well as the Guaranty dated April 14, 2005. The 
standard of review for this part of McQueen's appeal is also correctness. Cafe Rio, 2009 
UT 27, at ^21. 
The majority of McQueen's Brief, however, challenges the amount of the 
District Court's discovery sanctions included in the Order on Outstanding Motions entered 
June 23, 2009. (R. 3933-3936) This Court reviews the award of discovery sanctions under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Bode 11 Construction Co. v. Robbins, etaL, 2009 UT 52, [^16, 
215P.3d933. 
In its cross-appeal PC Crane challenges the grounds for the award of sanctions, 
and argues the District Court made no finding that PC Crane's conduct merited sanctions. 
This Court reviews "the legal sufficiency of factual findings" under a "correction-of-error 
standard" giving no deference to the trial court. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^  14, 
217P.3d733. 
The second issued raised on PC Crane's cross-appeal is the amount of costs 
awarded to McQueen. The trial court's decision to award costs to the prevailing party is 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Jensen v. Sawyers, etal, 2005 UT 81, ^ [140, 
130P.3d325. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DENIAL OF McOUEEN'S 
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
A, McQueen is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees Under the Promissory Notes. 
Under Utah law attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or 
contract. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, et al, 2002 UT 11, [^17, 40 P.3d 1119; Bonneville 
Distributing Co. v. Green River Development Associates, Inc., e?a/.,2007UTApp 175?^|42, 
164 P.3d 433. "Fees provided for by contract, moreover, are allowed only in strict 
accordance with the terms of the contract." IHC Health Services, Inc. v.D& K Management, 
Inc., 2008 UT 73, ^ [39, 196 P.3d 588 {quotingFoote, et al. v. Clark, etal, 962 P.2d 52, 54 
(Utah 1998)); Bonneville Distributing, 2007 UT App 175, at f!2. 
Cases applying these principles demonstrate that attorney fees are awarded only 
when the circumstances of the case come within the language of the specific provision in 
question. In IHC Health Services, the trial court ruled that IHC properly terminated its lease 
with the tenant and also awarded attorney fees to IHC. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed all other rulings but reversed the award of attorney fees based upon a strict reading 
of the lease provisions. Section 17.2 of the lease allowed recovery of attorney fees regardless 
whether the action was instituted during the term of the lease, but IHC waived this right by 
voluntarily dismissing its claim under Section 17.2 and relying exclusively on Section 23 for 
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its attorney fees claim. IHCHealth Services, 2008 UT 73, at ffi[41-42. However, Section 23 
of the lease provided for attorney fees only if the action was instituted during the term of the 
lease. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the term of the lease ended when IHC sent a notice 
of default more than a year before filing its complaint. Therefore, IHC could not recover 
under Section 23 and the Court reversed the award of fees. Id. at f43. 
The result in IHC Health Services follows the stated rule of interpretation that 
attorney fees under a contract provision are allowed "only in strict accordance with the terms 
of the contract." Id. at ^39. See also Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, et al.9 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1992) (reversing award of attorney fees incurred in recovering rent for holdover period 
because in that claim landlord "was not seeking to enforce the terms of the lease"). 
In Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., et al, 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, the 
Utah Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of attorney fees under a similar default 
provision because the plaintiff was not a defaulting party. The Court first cited the governing 
standard that fees provided for by contract "'are allowed only in strict accordance with the 
terms of the contract.'" Id. at [^73 (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 54). The terms of the contract 
at issue required that there be a defaulting party for attorney fees to be awarded. Giusti, 2009 
UT 2, at f73. The plaintiff had filed suit against the defendants alleging several claims 
including breach of contract. Id. at f 12. All of the plaintiffs claims were resolved in favor 
of the defendants. Id. at f 13. The defendants then filed a motion for attorney fees which was 
denied by the district court. Id. at [^14. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
attorney fees and held there was no default under the contract at issue, and therefore no basis 
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for an award of attorney fees. Id. at ^ 73. The case now on appeal followed the same course 
of proceedings as Giusti and should also reach the same result. 
This Court also recently held that an award of attorney fees may only be made 
"in strict accordance with" the terms of the contract. Jones, et al v Riche, et al, 2009 UT 
App 196, \2,216 P.3d 357 (quoting Giusti, 2009 UT 2, at f73). The Court ruled as follows: 
When a contract requires, as this one does, that the 
defaulting party pay attorney fees, "the sole criterion for [a 
party] to obtain attorney fees . . . is to show default by the other 
contract party.55 
Id. at p (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 54-55). The jury found that the Riches breached the 
contract. This Court concluded the Riches were the defaulting parties and therefore reversed 
the award of attorney fees. Jones, 2009 UT App 196, at %$. 
In Dale K. Barker Co. v. Bushnell, et al, 2009 UT App 385, 222 P.3d 1188, 
this Court also affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney fees because the claim was not 
based upon the contract provision. Defendant Bushnell filed a third party complaint against 
Barker, individually, claiming the "equitable doctrine of alter ego" would allow him to 
"pierce the corporate veil of Barker Company and impose on Barker personal liability" for 
any judgment in favor of Bushnell. The Court held that the claim was based on an alter ego 
theory and not on the contract. Id. at %5. Therefore, Barker was not entitled to an award of 
attorney fees for his successful defense of the third party complaint. 
These authorities require the same result in this case. It is clear from 
paragraph 3 of the Promissory Notes that any right to claim attorney fees is contingent, first, 
upon the occurrence of a default. The language states: "In the event of a default. . ." the 
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holder(s) of the Promissory Notes may take one or more of the actions identified. (R. 3608, 
3612 (emphasis added)) The District Court correctly ruled that no default occurred with 
respect to the Promissory Notes. PC Crane timely paid all monthly payments under the 
Promissory Notes. Balloon payments were deferred based upon McQueen's Stipulation and 
the Court's Order (R. 3630-3631, 3635-3636), and were later paid pursuant to the Order of 
August 7, 2008. (R. 3647-3648) It is also clear that no other type of default specified in 
paragraph 2 occurred. There was no insolvency and no default under the Deed of Trust, the 
Security Agreement, or any other note. Because there was no default, the District Court 
correctly ruled that McQueen could not recover attorney fees. 
The gist of McQueen's position is that PC Crane effectively defaulted under 
the Promissory Notes by filing the action for breach of the Purchase Agreements. (Aplts. Br. 
at 44-45.) However, from paragraph 2 of the Promissory Notes it is clear that filing an action 
does not constitute a "default." The five possible events of default are clearly defined and do 
not include an action for breach of the Purchase Agreements. 
Moreover, even if a default had occurred, a further condition to a claim for 
attorney fees required McQueen to commence legal action for collection and enforcement of 
the Notes including costs and attorney fees incurred. (R. 3608, 3612) The facts show 
McQueen never did so. (R. 3907) Indeed, the Stipulation and Order explicitly prohibited 
McQueen from taking "any action to ... declare the Plaintiffs ... in default of their 
obligations under" the Promissory Notes or taking "any other action under either Note prior 
to the entry of a final judgment in the above-captioned case . . . ." (R. 3631, 3636) 
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Therefore, McQueen also cannot satisfy the second condition required by the Promissory 
Notes. 
Finally, the District Court also ruled that even if PC Crane was in default for 
not paying the lump sums on the dates specified in the Promissory Notes, McQueen still was 
not entitled to attorney fees. McQueen "specifically waived any right to act upon the default 
in the Stipulation." (R. 3907) In the Stipulation McQueen agreed "to stay any action to 
foreclose, enforce, collect, or otherwise declare the Plaintiffs . . . in default of their 
obligations" under the Promissory Notes. (R. 3631) Waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. Soter 's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 857 P.2d 935,940 
(Utah 1993). By signing the Stipulation and submitting it for the District Court's approval, 
McQueen knowingly relinquished the right to declare a default based upon the deferral of 
lump sum payments. 
For these reasons this Court should affirm the judgment below and rule that 
McQueen is not entitled to attorney fees under the Promissory Notes. 
B. The Purchase Agreements Have No Attorney Fee Clause. 
It is obvious here that neither of the Purchase Agreements have an attorney fee 
clause and McQueen is not entitled to attorney fees for the successful defense of an action on 
the Purchase Agreements. PC Crane alleged McQueen breached the Purchase Agreements 
by failing to deliver goodwill and that he misrepresented facts when the Purchase 
Agreements were signed. Those were the only claims submitted to the jury. (R. 3316-3320) 
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All other claims alleged in the Complaint were also based on the Purchase Agreements or 
were tort claims. (R. 1-25) 
Because the Purchase Agreements have no attorney fee clause, McQueen tries 
to make the Court believe this action was in reality a suit to rescind the Promissory Notes. 
(Aplts. Br. at 44-45.) The cases cited above, however, make clear that Utah courts only 
allow fee claims if they strictly conform to the language of the contract. PC Crane has found 
no authority, nor has McQueen cited any, holding that a fee provision in one contract can be 
effectively transferred to another contract to support an attorney fee claim. Although the 
Promissory Notes are related to the Purchase Agreements, they are separate and distinct 
instruments. The best evidence of their separateness is the fact that these parties chose not to 
include attorney fee provisions in the Purchase Agreements but did include them in the 
Promissory Notes. Because the Purchase Agreements have no fee provisions this Court 
should affirm the District Court's denial of McQueen's claim for attorney fees. 
Moreover, even if the attorney fee clauses in the Promissory Notes could be 
transferred to the Purchase Agreements, it is clear that PC Crane committed no breach or 
default under the Purchase Agreements. The jury specifically found that PC Crane 
performed all of its obligations under Purchase Agreements. (R. 3316-3320). 
C. McQueen Raises a New Issue. 
McQueen raises a new issue for the first time on this appeal contending that 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 supports an award of attorney fees here. This issue was not 
raised in the District Court and therefore has not been properly preserved for appeal. To 
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preserve an issue for appeal it must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial 
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. 438 Main Street, et al v. Easy Heat, Inc., et 
al9 2004 UT 72,1J51, 99 P.3d 801; Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 2010 UT 
App 9,^10, 223 P.3d 1141. 
McQueen did not make a claim in the District Court for attorney fees based 
upon § 78B-5-826. It was not raised in McQueen's Answer and Counterclaim (R. 97-117), 
his Motions for Award of Attorney Fees (R. 3477-3514), or in his arguments to the District 
Court. (R. 4003). McQueen made reference to the statute in a footnote of a reply 
memorandum (R. 3668), but did not present the issue in such a way that the District Court 
had an opportunity to rule on it. Accordingly, the issue was not preserved for appeal and this 
Court need not address it. 
Moreover, the argument plainly fails on the merits and should be rejected. 
Utah's reciprocal attorney fee statute applies "when a contract creates 'an unequal exposure 
to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees,' [and is applied] to ensure that both 
parties are subject to the attorney fees provisions." Giusti, 2009 UT 2, at f77 (quoting 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ^19, 160 P.3d 1041); see also Jones, 2009 UT App 196, 
at [^5. The statute is designed to equalize circumstances when the contract gives only one 
party the right to claim attorney fees. McQueen was not faced with "an unequal exposure" to 
the risk of attorney fees. To the contrary, the Promissory Notes provided for attorney fees 
payable only to McQueen. (R. 3608, 3612) As for the Purchase Agreements, no party has a 
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right to claim attorney fees. For those reasons McQueen's argument based on § 78B-5-826 
should be rejected.4 
D. Other Attorney Fee Arguments. 
L Trust Deed. 
McQueen also contends the Trust Deed (R. 3622-3627) supports his claim and 
that fees should be awarded under the Trust Deed for two reasons. First, he says this action 
sought to extinguish the debt secured by the Trust Deed and therefore it affected the security 
or the rights of McQueen. (Aplts. Br. at 47.) McQueen cannot demonstrate how this action 
affected the security of the Trust Deed or the rights or powers of McQueen. The District 
Court rejected the argument for that reason. (R. 3908) The District Court also found PC 
Crane did not "fail to make any payment" under the Promissory Notes, and for that reason as 
well the Trust Deed provision did not apply. (R. 3908) For the same reasons this Court 
should affirm the judgment below. 
Second, McQueen argues he opposed unsuccessfully the Court's Order 
requiring McQueen to accept full payment of the Promissory Notes and to reconvey the Trust 
Deed. In essence, McQueen's position is even though the District Court concluded 
McQueen had no grounds for refusing to accept full payment of the Promissory Notes and 
refusing to reconvey the Trust Deed (R. 2757-2760), McQueen should be given attorney fees 
for taking that position. The argument is without merit and should be rejected. 
4
 The only case McQueen cites in support of this argument is Hooban v. Unicity 
International Inc., 2009 UT App 287, 220 P.3d 485. McQueen fails to note that the Utah 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case on January 20, 2010. See Hooban v. Unicity, 
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ii. Guaranty. 
McQueen also claims attorney fees under a Guaranty dated April 14, 2005. 
(R. 3849) The Guaranty does not apply unless there is a default on the underlying 
instrument, Le. one of the Promissory Notes.5 (R. 3849) As shown above no such default 
occurred. Therefore, McQueen had no basis to seek payment from the guarantors and no 
grounds to now claim attorney fees under the Guaranty. 
iii. Chase v. Scott. 
McQueen contends the case of Chase v. Scott,200l UTApp404,38P.3d 1001 
supports his claim for attorney fees under the Promissory Notes. (Aplts. Br. at 45-46) For at 
least two reasons this argument has no merit. First, the language of the fee provision in 
Chase is materially different from paragraph 3.1 of the Promissory Notes. The provision in 
Chase reads: "In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." Chase, 2001 UT 
App 404, at ^5. As described above, the Promissory Notes in this case require: (1) a default 
and (2) enforcement action by McQueen, neither of which occurred. 
Second, in Chase the contract that was the subject of the litigation was the 
same contract which contained the attorney fee clause. Here, the Purchase Agreements were 
the subject of the action below, but McQueen seeks attorney fees under the Promissory Notes 
and the Trust Deed. The Court should reject this argument as without merit. 
225 P.3d 880 (table) (Utah 2010). 
5
 The Guaranty only covered the second of the two Promissory Notes addressed in 
McQueen's appeal. (See R. 3849 and 3611-3615) 
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iv. Implied Covenant. 
Finally, McQueen contends the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
supports his claim for attorney fees. (Aplts. Br. at 44 n.30). McQueen argues PC Crane filed 
suit to "escape" the payments required by the Promissory Notes which it alleges is a breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id) McQueen's argument fails on 
the express language of the Purchase Agreements and the Promissory Notes, as shown above, 
and the implied covenant cannot rescue him. Moreover, it is well established in Utah law 
that the covenant "cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to which the 
parties did not agree — " Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertson 's, Inc., et al, 2004 UT 101, 
f^45, 104 P.3d 1226. McQueen's argument would require this Court to add new language to 
the Purchase Agreements and/or the Promissory Notes to which McQueen and PC Crane did 
not agree. Accordingly, this argument should be rejected as without merit. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
AWARD OF SANCTIONS. 
A. The District Court's Order Does Not Satisfy Rule 37 and Should be 
Reversed. 
Rule 3 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the award of sanctions 
for certain discovery violations. McQueen's Motion sought sanctions under Rules 37(b)(2), 
37(d), and 26(g). (Addendum 1.) Neither the District Court's Ruling entered April 29,2009 
nor its Order of June 23,2009 specifies which Rule of Civil Procedure the Court relied upon. 
(R. 3911-3915,3933-3936) Neither one made a finding that PC Crane's conduct warranted 
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sanctions under any of those Rules. Therefore, the Ruling and Order fail to satisfy the 
requirement that a District Court make "a factual finding that the party's behavior merits 
sanctions." Kilpatrick, etal v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., etai, 2008 UT 82, ^ [23,199 P.3d 
957. PC Crane respectfully requests this Court to reverse that part of the Ruling and the 
Order which awarded discovery sanctions against PC Crane. 
The District Court did not make a finding legally sufficient to support any type 
of discovery sanction. The Court did not find that PC Crane had "fail[ed] to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery" as would be required for sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2). Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); Hales v. Oldroyd, e/a/.,2000UT App 75,^19,999 P.2d 588. TheCourt 
did not find that PC Crane failed to serve discovery responses under Rules 33 or 34, as would 
be required for an award of sanctions under Rule 37(d). Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d); Coxey v. 
Fraternal Order of the Eagles, 2005 UT App 185, f 3, 112 P.3d 1244. The District Court 
also did not find PC Crane made a "certification" in violation of Rule 26(g) in connection 
with any discovery response. (R. 3911-3915,3933-3936) Instead, the District Court simply 
ruled as follows: 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs position on March 26, 
2008, that the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with 
Plaintiffs' previous position that the trailer had existed, there 
was just no documentation regarding the trailer. Based upon the 
inconsistency of Plaintiffs position, the Court holds that 
sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions. 
(R. 3913-3914) After all of McQueen's complaints, the only mistake the District Court 
found was that PC Crane's later position was "inconsistent" with its prior position, 
(R. 3913-3914) 
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This Court should rule that the finding of the District Court is legally 
insufficient to support an award of sanctions. The Court reviews "the legal sufficiency of 
factual findings . . . under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to 
the trial court." Kirnballv. Kimball, 2009 UTApp 233, f 14,217 P.3d 733. When reviewing 
the impositions of sanctions, this Court must first "ensure that the district court has made a 
factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at f 23. 
Sanctions are warranted when: (1) the party's behavior was willful, (2) the party acted in bad 
faith, (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party, or (4) the party has engaged in 
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. Id. at ^|25. 
If the District Court makes such a finding, the choice of an appropriate sanction 
is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge. Coxey, 2005 UT App 185, at f 5; Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997). Because trial courts must deal first 
hand with the parties and the discovery process, they are given broad discretion regarding the 
imposition of discovery sanctions. Coxey, 2005 UTApp 185, at^|5; Morton, 938 P.2d at 274; 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, et al, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). The 
trial court will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, 
at 1J23; Morton, 938 P.2d at 274; Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6. 
It is important to note that the term "fault," being "a general term included 
within a list of more specific terms," is given a meaning analogous to the other terms within 
the list. Therefore, "fault" must "involve intentional behavior." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, 
at 133. 
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Here the District Court did not find, nor could it find, that PC Crane failed to 
respond to a discovery request, failed to obey an order to provide discovery, or failed to 
properly certify a discovery response. The District Court also made no finding of willfulness, 
bad faith, fault, or persistent dilatory tactics on the part of PC Crane. The Court simply 
found an "inconsistency" and then awarded a minimal amount of attorney fees. Because PC 
Crane diligently tried to respond to McQueen's numerous discovery requests, even a small 
amount of sanctions is unacceptable and PC Crane challenges the award by this Cross-
Appeal. Because the District Court made no such finding the award of sanctions should be 
reversed. 
B. Discovery Regarding "Custom Designed Trailer," Put in Context. 
The majority of McQueen's discovery surrounded the reference to a "custom 
designed trailer" in a document PC Crane submitted with a loan application. The issue was 
marginally relevant at best, but it dominated discovery for over a year and then became the 
focus of McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions. McQueen pursued this discovery 
ostensibly as a defense to PC Crane's claims for failure to deliver goodwill. The focus on the 
trailer issue illustrates that McQueen misunderstood those claims. 
PC Crane alleged that McQueen failed to deliver goodwill in the form of 
customer relationships, as required by the Purchase Agreements, because: (a) McQueen did 
nothing to solidify those relationships with PC Crane; (b) McQueen himself did not have a 
business relationship with most of his crane customers, Stam did; and (c) McQueen 
concealed Stam's true role in the business and his long term relationships with the customers. 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
McQueen was convinced that discovery on the trailer issue would develop a winning defense 
to the goodwill claims - if PC Crane collaborated with Stam between October 2004 and 
March 2005, then it must have known of Stam's true role before March 2005. So McQueen 
feverishly pursued discovery of "collaborations" about a trailer for the 300. 
Thus, the trailer discovery which led up to the first discovery order, the Order 
on Motion to Quash and Motions to Compel entered November 2, 2007 (R. 1096-1099), 
sought documents which would show the timing of such collaborations. McQueen's 
arguments at the hearing of September 5, 2007 likewise focused on the timing of 
collaborations. (R. 4001, T. 29-31) PC Crane's discovery responses made clear that (a) the 
collaborations occurred in late 2005 or early 2006, long after PC Crane learned on its own of 
Stam's true role in the McQueen business; and (b) there were no documents reflecting the 
collaborations, which consisted of simple discussions between Stam and Paul Belcher. 
However, based on "independent information''not disclosed to PC Crane at the 
time, McQueen remained convinced that the trailer referenced in the loan application was in 
fact the Fontaine trailer which Vern modified for use with the 165 in March 2005. McQueen 
thus tried to force the proverbial square peg into a round hole, i.e. to prove that the Fontaine 
was in fact the "custom designed trailer" and that the "collaborations" actually occurred in or 
before March 2005. Therefore, McQueen's second round of discovery, which led to the 
Court's second discovery Order entered March 20,2008 (R. 2081-2085), was directed at the 
modification of any trailer by PC Crane. McQueen's arguments at the hearing on March 4, 
2008 likewise focused on the modification of trailers, i.e. that the "custom designed trailer" 
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referenced in the loan application and the Fontaine were one and the same. (R. 4002, 
T. 10-11) Judge Dever's ruling also focused on "whether or not it was the same trailer — " 
(R. 4002, T. 66) Following the second Order, counsel went back to PC Crane for more 
information on the collaborations and learned that the "custom designed trailer" was never 
ultimately built, because the need to down rent the 300 disappeared as the business grew. 
McQueen believed PC Crane had been lying all along and filed the Second 
Motion for Sanctions. At the hearing on that Motion held March 31, 2009, PC Crane's 
counsel Paul P. Burghardt explained that because discovery requests had focused on whether 
documents existed, a miscommunication occurred: 
If I made one mistake it was in [not] earlier asking my client 
more questions about the 300-ton trailer. . . . I did not and I 
admit today that it is my fault for not asking the question, was 
that trailer ever built? Is it red? Is it blue? Is it green? I didn't 
ask those questions. 
(R. 4003, T. 101) At first McQueen's discovery requests had focused on the existence of 
documents that may show the timing of collaborations between PC Crane and Stam. As the 
focus shifted to the modification of any trailer, counsel for PC Crane learned the "custom 
designed trailer" was never built, and promptly notified McQueen. 
This new information resulted from a simple miscommunication, which 
McQueen repeatedly characterized below in these terms: a "horrendous abuse" (R. 4003, 
T. 77), a "charade" (id.), a "deception" (id., T. 108), "outrageous" (id.), "patently false 
statements" (Addendum 1, McQueen Memo at 9), and "intentionally obstructing discovery." 
(Id.) McQueen himself acknowledges those are "offensive words." (Id.) Yet his Brief on 
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this appeal continues the accusatory language about PC Crane and its counsel: "dishonest" 
(Aplts. Br. at 12), "patently frivolous" (id. at 13), "perversion of the legal process" (id. at 27), 
"gross misbehavior" (id. at 28), "series of lies" (id. at 29), "admittedly a lie" (id. at 39), 
"baseless, false position" (id.), "contrived falsehood" (id. at 40), "palpably wrong, dishonest 
behavior" (id.\ and "shocking case." (Id. at41.)6 Despite McQueen's contentions, however, 
the District Court found it was merely an "inconsistent" position. (R. 3914) This finding is 
not legally insufficient to support an award of sanctions, and the Ruling and Order should be 
reversed. 
There are sound policy reasons for requiring a specific finding that a party's 
behavior "merits sanctions." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at ^ 23. Information often develops in 
bits and pieces during discovery, and the state of facts at one point in time might easily be 
seen as inconsistent with the facts when viewed later in time. Utah's standard is designed to 
avoid imposing sanctions for innocent or even negligent mistakes. The party's actions must 
be "willful," in "bad faith," or involve some other kind of "intentional behavior." Id. at ^ [33. 
If a merely "inconsistent" position were the only requirement, the majority of cases in the 
district courts would justify discovery sanctions. Clearly that is not what Rule 37 and Utah 
case law contemplate. 
6
 It is important to note that the District Court awarded sanctions only against PC Crane, not 
its counsel. Yet McQueen's Brief is replete with accusations directed at PC Crane's counsel. 
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POINT IV 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE AMOUNT OF SANCTIONS 
AWARDED SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
If this Court holds the District Court's finding was sufficient to support 
discovery sanctions, then the amount of the award should be affirmed. The review of a 
sanctions award follows a two step process. First, the Court ensures that the District Court 
"has made a factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions." Kilpatrick, 2008 
UT 82, at ^[23. This was addressed in Point III above. 
"Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only disturb the 
sanction if 'abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown."' Id. {quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274) 
(emphasis original). This deferential review recognizes that trial courts must deal first hand 
with the parties and the discovery process. Id. {quoting Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6.) 
Based upon his finding as quoted above, Judge Reese determined to award 
McQueen his reasonable attorney fees "in conjunction with bringing the Second Motion for 
Sanctions only." (R. 3914) Judge Reese made clear that the scope of this award was very 
limited: 
As the Court held above, it is not interested in reconsidering 
Judge Dever's previous rulings and will not award sanctions for 
any motions upon which Judge Dever already ruled. Defense 
counsel shall submit an affidavit to prove the amount of his 
reasonable attorney's fees within ten (10) days of this Ruling. 
As noted above, the affidavit should only detail attorney's fees 
associated with preparing and arguing the Second Motion for 
Sanctions. No other attorney's fees will be awarded. 
(R. 3914) The amount then awarded was $7,475. (R. 3934) 
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The District Court is "granted a great deal of deference" in determining the 
amount of a sanction. Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at f23. To prove a trial court abused its 
discretion an appellant must demonstrate "either that the sanction is based on an erroneous 
conclusion of law or that the sanction lacks an evidentiary basis." SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 
et aL, 2008 UT App 31, ^ [14, 177 P.3d 629 (quoting Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997)). In that case, Comtrol asked for dismissal of the plaintiffs case or in 
the alternative an order preventing plaintiffs use of certain documents at trial. Id. at ^ 15. 
Given the breath of discretion afforded to the trial court, this Court held that the selection of 
the lesser sanction was not an abuse of discretion. Id. 
McQueen's appeal fails to show a clear abuse of discretion by the District 
Court. Given that Judge Reese found only an "inconsistency," and not bad faith, willfulness, 
or other intentional conduct, it follows that the amount of his award was comparatively small. 
McQueen points to nothing but his own dissatisfaction to suggest that the amount of the 
award was an abuse of discretion. McQueen does not argue an erroneous conclusion of law 
nor does he suggest the District Court's award lacked an evidentiary basis. See Comtrol, 
Inc., 2008 UT App 31, at ^14. Accordingly, his challenge should be rejected.7 
It is also important to note that McQueen's Motion asked for dismissal of the 
case as a discovery sanction. (See Addendum 1.) The jury found in favor of McQueen on all 
of PC Crane's claims (R. 3316-3320), which rendered the Motion moot. Because 
7
 There is no authority for the argument that this Court should "lighten McQueen's burden" 
simply because Judge Reese did not preside over the case during discovery. (Aplts. Br. at 27) 
Utah case law consistently requires showing a clear abuse of discretion. Moreover, it was 
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fees ; instea< 1 < )f < list nisss il (R 4003. ' I ' 80) Now he contends 'the amount awarded was not 
enough. On appeal McQueen seeks a greater award that will effectively pay him the attorney 
fees that were denied in the three other Motu>n> nk.ii w.^ ;f. • district Court, (R 2359-2380, 
3 Ir 7 7 -3 51 4, 3 842-3 849; R ,. 390 4 3910 3 i 11 3915). 
If there were grounds to impose discovery sanctions, the District Court's 
determination -if me amount should be granted a great deal of deference" and should be 
affirmed. Moreover, no attomey fees shwulo ix* awarded to McQueen on this appeal 
THE AMOUNT OF COSTS AWARDED WAS IMPROPER. 
R ulc 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "speaks of'costs,' but does 
reqi lired to be paid to it ic: con n t ai id to witnesse ,. and lot '• a* • w liich the statutes authorize to 
be included in the judgment." Frampton v. W 1/SOIL 6(b P. 2d " 7 I.. 774 ('T "iah !c srr- "There 
is a distinction to be understood between the legitimate and taxable VOM a.ni »'ii.er 
costs." Id. While deposition expenses are allowed under certain limited circumstances, costs 
for serving subpoenas are not properly taxable as cosh hi; see also Lloyd's Unlimited v. 
Nature's Way \)u*k<:hh^. Lut * .. • - ;,. , r i'>*w. 
McQueen, not PC Crane, who souuht Judge Dever's recusal 
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The District Court awarded as costs all of McQueen's expenses associated with 
the depositions but did not award subpoena expenses. (R. 3959) 
A. Depositions. 
"The general rule regarding the recovery of deposition costs is that a party may 
recover deposition costs as long as 'the trial court is persuaded that [the depositions] were 
taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the 
development and presentation of the case."5 Young v. University of Utah, 2000 UT 91, f6, 
16 P.3d 549 (quoting Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 
1042, 1051 (Utah 1984)). A party must show that "the deposition was used in some 
meaningful way at trial o r . . . the development of the case was of such a complex nature that 
the information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained through less 
expensive means of discovery." Young, 2000 UT 91, at f7. 
In Young, the trial court awarded costs for the depositions of the hospital's own 
employees taken by the plaintiff, and for the deposition of the plaintiff taken by the hospital. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the award for the hospital's own employees holding that 
"there were other methods of acquiring the information contained in the depositions. For 
example, the hospital could have interviewed the doctors prior to trial." Id. The Court also 
reversed the award of costs for the hospital's deposition of the plaintiff because the 
deposition was not used at trial in a meaningful way. Id. at f 11. 
In this action the District Court awarded $400.60 for McQueen's deposition of 
his own accountant, Kelly Banyard. Like the deposition expenses for the hospital's 
40 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
employees i«i J <"/"<>, [|HS inlormaiinii could have been nhlainrd il imiif ' l i an inli n i n s < \illlli 
f • TcQueen also did not use the Banyard deposit ion at trial. 
The District Court also awarded $928.95 in costs for McQueen ' s depositions of 
Jason K, Nelsen (PC Crane ' s former counsel) and Courtney Belcher (wife of Paul Belcher) 
t - - • • ) i - i n a v^ouii excluded the testimony of Jason Nelsen as irrelevant in an Order in 
Limine, (R. 3264-3268) Acco rd i imh . lhev were not "used in some meaningful way at trial," 
and were not otherwise necessary i«>. •*., KW * J o p m e n t of the case. Young it L, 
I u i[ ; 
The District Court also awarded $442.1 u m deposition costs for the second 
deposit ions of Paul Belcher. David Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and I .on Stai n, which w ere 
taken exclusively on (he MibjeU ol n ai Icr modifications, i liese deposit ions were not used at 
-* •
 ,s
 i n t < "mini i"M hiilntllir majonlN nl'lhr i videmv on 1 li, it suh|ci I h it'.^Nilvi 
on Moiion in Limine Re: Trailer Modifications. (R. 3269-3272) 
For those reasons, this Court should rediu ^ the District Court's award of costs 
by the amount of $ 1, 7 71 65, whicl i is the total of tl le deposition expenses refei enced abo v e. 
COM J CSION 
For the reasons set forth above. PC Crane respectfully requests !hi> Court u-
rule as follows. I he Com tshould ailirmtli^khUi. wi McQueen's Motions lor. .uo;ue> s-ee^  
reverse the award of discovery sanctions lor lack of a finding to support them. Alternatively, 
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the Court should affirm the amount of the sanctions awarded. The Court should also reduce 
the amount of costs awarded as explained above. The Court should award no attorney fees or 
costs to McQueen on this Appeal. 
DATED this 3 day of May, 2010. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
THEW C. BARNECK 
PAUL P. BURGHARDT 
Attorneys for Appellees and Cross-Appellants 
PC Crane, LLC, et al. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IHF.RHBY CKRTIFY that two true and c« meet copies ofthe foregoing Brief of 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, plus searchable CD, was served by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, on this
 v-^ day o! Ma}. 2(H. < - the following: 
Bruce A. Maak. ksq 
PARR WADDOIIPS BROWN •  H . .. . >•. i-ns> 
185 South State Street. »7n<", 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 i . 
Attorneys for Appellants and Cro^^-ippellees 
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A- tiKNDUM 
1. Second Motion for Sanations daicd TUIK- ~A. 2008, and Memorandum in Support, of 
Second Motion for Sanctions daied June 2 4. 20os 
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niuce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Viorneys for Defendants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
!
 Lake City, Utah 84111 
.ucphone: 801-532-7840 
Fax: 801-532-7750 
mi I I I inn mi iiinn in \ i i n s i lint in i o n i i m ni< \ ui i i \ M < I n i < i ' il 
STATE OF UTAH 
j'C CRANE, LLC, a L'tal, hm.lLu ua'on. 
company, LACY, LLC, a Utah limited 
liabilin compam. DAVID PALI 
'• 1IER, VERNON BELCHER, PA I 
* u>HH CH^R. 'nd-ichr1-
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
McQUEEN MASONRY , INC., a I Itah 
corporation, CENTRAL EQUIPMENT, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
McQUEEN CRANE SERVICES, LC\ a 
Utah limited liability company, JAMES 
McQUEEN, an individual, 
Defendai its. 
SECOND MOTi • t 
SANCTIONS 
C -
. • " . M; I : 
jiuhv 1.. A. Dover 
: x _ i . ' , ._ . . -.ov move 11 : • •: n - • A-
26(g). \ Hah Knir - of i 1\ d Procedure, to dismi^ with nieiudiec planitiiTs" Complaint in tl lis 
action because of the conduct of plaintiffs a:..: i:i. . . . . ; : ; . : - * misrepresenting m;- :\K 
to the Court. ' " ) misrepn'ser<tm» ?nn*crial farts \o McQueen, (iii) disobeying this Court's 
Discover) Urdci an*: ;. im .h ;;,-, ,ck \^ oi>)ecu<ai.s i^ discovery requests, 
A Memorandum in Support of this Motion accompanies this pleading. 
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McQueen also seeks an award of its attorneys fees to be established by affidavit at the 
appropriate time. The attorneys fee award is addressed with other requests for attorneys fees 
relief in a separate motion being concurrently filed by McQueen. 
DATED this £ 4 day of June, 2008. 
aak, Of Counsel 
^ADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l\V H - : > R " n •! , i • H i . • - vt. v \ \ i I f< , \ 
served fhi- ^"T-* da. <ii Jim- , /OON ;{:• .a i..*i .: eop\ iheieof, addressed 
Mal tha (' BaiiKck, Esq 
Em! i1 Barghardl. Esq 
HARDS BRANDT M1LI-ER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
299 South Main Street <?• m : 15013 
V O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake € i u , I ! **U 10-2465 
•-^ V 
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Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-532-7840 
Fax: 801-532-7750 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PC CRANE, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, LACY, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, DAVID PAUL 
BELCHER, VERNON BELCHER, PAUL 
DAVID BELCHER, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
McQUEEN MASONRY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, CENTRAL EQUIPMENT, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
McQUEEN CRANE SERVICES, LC, a 
Utah limited liability company, JAMES 
McQUEEN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Civil No. 060915007 
Judge: L. A, Dever 
This should have been a simple case to prepare for trial. As things have turned out, 
however, McQueen has spent far more in discovery disputes requiring plaintiffs ("PC") to 
respond than McQueen has spent in all other aspects of case preparation. The discovery disputes 
have focused on McQueen's effort to prove that PC was heavily involved with Stam before the 
second crane transaction in April, 2005, contrary to the consistent position taken by all of PC's 
principals that no substantive communications occurred in that period of time. 
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At the last discovery hearing, McQueen asked tnc i. -un ;,, hinx* i-\. u.- sut ;-1v 
information about a trailer that PC claimed had been modified in collaboration with Stam,., which 
McQueen believes occurred in March and early April, 2005. The Court forced PC to supply 
a dditional infor mation andallovs depositions to betaken. That information and those depositions 
establish that PC and its counsel 1 lave engaged in yet another effort to frustrate the discovery 
pmeess ami m puipi ns/h uiisiepieseril muter hi I I tin Is In Mt< hiecii -mini fn this (lmn1 on ilie sulked 
of that trailer. 
i * i -.. iL J =/ * *±>Al •**"* >**J L1 >!. **» U i / i ^ i 1 1 ^ ' * i U*M i ^ •' > i ' i *±}Lt% v * * _ */_. i u * . - * * i.' *JA*_A*T *4 .J I ' i l iK r 
In a document given to its lenders. PC stated the following: 
une oi ule upcia* >n. ui<u wu aiiu l.uii coliuborateu v n 
was in the building of a c jiu-d trailer that gives us the ability to 
use our 300-ton hydraulic I.iebhcrr crane as either a 100-ton crane o- .i 
Uo-ton eraik This is th primary reason for the drastic increase in the 
mnual revenue production o\ tlm machine 
The crawler cranes are the next business endeavor that we are 
• :i-ipMratiiiLr with I ,on to undertake [Exhibit 1]. 
Documents obtained from Bank of American Fork when the Court refused, to quash P ~" 
subpoena demonstrated tl: lat the ,ccrawlei ei ai ies' "' busii less ei ydeavoi occui red in lati ,: , -
hence, the building of a custom designed trailer necessarily occurred before the end of 2005, 
McQueen then sent its I bird Set of Interrogatories and Requnsi lloi I'timim i tnjiitr'.iiini1, 
information ^ubvrnmg date:> of umstnu f IM--. <»j the trailer an.d wh(> participaled in ••: 
modification. ; hied a patently in vol-..u.- ,-•!>;_ <„ L . .. ...,-;, rv^ucu *:ujeainb .* . ; :;; 
"overly broad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant" and refused to respond. I PxhiHi : ^ laak 
sent Burghardt an email August 10, °.007 explaining the obvious relevance <•: th, ;n:• .rnuiion 
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and requesting production. [Exhibit 3] Burghardt responded by letter stating that prior to April, 
2005, "PC Crane and Mr. Stam had no communications or interaction concerning the subject 
trailer." [Exhibit 4] On August 13,2007 Burghardt emailed Maak saying that he would respond 
to the interrogatories if they were limited to the period between October, 2004 and April, 2005. 
[Exhibit 5] Maak emailed Burghardt indicating he was unwilling to limit the time period to prior 
to April 2005. [Exhibit 6] 
McQueen moved to compel responses to the Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests on 
August 7, 2007. In its response filed August 30, 2007, PC stated: "Even though plaintiffs 
believe the records concerning the subject trailer are not relevant to the issues in this case, they 
are willing to respond to the Discovery Requests if limited to the relevant time period of October, 
2004 to March, 2005." PC requested that the Court limit McQueen's discovery to the period 
prior to March, 2005. [Exhibit 7, p. 5] At the hearing before the Court on McQueen's Motion to 
Compel, Burghardt stated as follows to the Court: "[TJhere was a document produced by us that 
made some reference to Mr. Stam and PC Crane collaborating on a trailer. This trailer. Your 
Honor, as we certified in a letter, this collaboration occurred much after the purchase of the 
fourth crane in April of 2005. It was well into the year 2006." Later he stated, uThe trailer 
wasn't even conceived of until the year 2006 between Stam and the Belchers. At that time, a 
year and a half after they purchased the first cranes, there clearly is no relevance to their 
collaboration on this trailer." [Exhibit 8] This Court on November 2,2007 entered an Order on 
Motion to Quash and Motions to Compel, which required production of all documents relating to 
the trailer prior to December, 2005. fl| 2(e)] In response, Burghardt sent Maak a letter stating 
that "plaintiffs have no responsive documents." [Exhibit 9] 
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McQueen then sent his Four th Set of Interrogatories and Reques t for Production, which in 
iMMyrr.i- - u . " •-- • <-^ :" leek trailers t imli t owned n the trailer variety 
that was modified •, P< objected to the request that it was i>\ e»- b: oad .induh burdensome, and 
seeks irrelevant m i. ' 'J iJ ia,i Hi » i i „ 1 1 F "„ , Exhibit I01 ' Vf "! )ec< mb< a 7 2007 Maak : v\ rote Burghardt 
observed that the Cour t had ordered production oi documen t s relat ing to the trailer prior to 
I >eceinl>ei\ <!0h \ .null dial he li ul iiidepeiuk iilh vciifii (I llv i \istent r oi lhij liailei Hi staled 
We intend lo seek sanctions if the document s relat ing to this trailer and i:u-
answer to luteiTOgatory N o . A are not immediate ly forthcoming. When we 
do, and when this matter plays out. we do not want you or your client l He 
able to say that there was some innocent mis take made, V ou and yoiu 
client arc on notice that the trailer in question was made and titled during 
the t ime period for which product ion was o r d u e d in the Court. If these 
documents arc not produced now, in response to this very pointed request, 
;, ,^;u K,, ^i eor u i a i tV^A/ }1(T^> K-on mtr!f'*M) *!i\ w i|l ihe^d [Exhibit 11] 
Burghardt responded, drawing a diM.inelu;n between the original m.tnuiacture ol the subject 
, , . ! ! i ; i I..M 5 .*Ul i l \eMeU i i : J ( . ( i i m o u j ' i -
inanulactured earlier the Court's Order addressed "the manufacture of the eustomr/eo uanei 
Burghardt stated thai PC had no documents relating lo tin mamiiiielun* ol lln: ''custom designed 
trailer'5 prior to 'December 2005." [Exhibit 12] 
McQueen filed its ' I hird Motion U * ( '( >mpe. uu iJuwi-.jv. . - - oo - seeking pi- .m 
the withheld information In us response p r stated that it objected to the request "because it 
sought information outside ui ihe scope oi discovery auiL . * .; .„. - - ... ...a .u iiie 
period prior to December 31, 2005 — and that McQueen's seeking such information to ensure 
that PC was not hiding documents was improper, [Exhibit 13, pp. 12-13] 
In brielinf, it? Tl ud Motion to Compel,. McQueen supplied additional information 
demonstrating that PC modified a trailer in the March-April, 2005 time frame and asked the 
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Court to force PC to produce and respond to the interrogatories aimed at that issue. At the 
argument of that Motion, Mr. Barneck stated as follows: 
[T]he Court said, in its Order - and we — that's what we're going 
by — in paragraph 2(e) it says, "All documents created prior to December, 
2005 concerning the design, production, and manufacture or construction 
of that certain custom designed trailer." 
Your Honor, there aren't any documents and Counsel can believe 
there are until the cows come home, but that won't create documents that 
don't exist Did they collaborate? Yes, they did. What was the time of 
that collaboration? I don't know. I don't agree with Counsel's assertion 
that because the next paragraph says the next business endeavor means 
that it was the next one in chronological order? I don't know what they 
meant by that. But they did collaborate and there just aren't any 
documents. 
Mr. Barneck continued: 
PC Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to 
create one. This was for a different crane. It was for the 165 Liebherr. 
The other one that Counsel's complaining about from the loan documents 
was for the 300. Different crane. 
[Exhibit 14] 
The Court entered an Order on Third Motion to Compel and Motion to Impose Sanctions 
requiring PC to supply all documents reflecting work done to modify any drop deck trailers 
owned by plaintiffs prior to December 31, 2005 and to allow McQueen to depose PC's principals 
on the subject of work done to modify any drop deck trailer. [Exhibit 15] In response to that 
Order, Burghardt sent Maak a letter dated March 26,2008 in which PC completely changed its 
position on the subject trailer — instead of continuing to assert and certify that the "subject 
trailer" had been built long after December, 2005, PC now took the position that "THE 
TRAILER... WAS NEVER ACTUALLY BUILT'! [Exhibit 16] In other words, once the 
Court allowed discovery that would demonstrate that the "subject trailer" was in fact modified in 
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March and April, 2005, P r changed \IK. posiuuii lual a had been o:riii> :ng ana repic*. - o. » 
( Court and to McQueen for 7 months from the claim that the "subject trailer'' was r idilicd in 
2U06 to the position that the trailer was never built at all McQueen invites the Coun > re\ iew 
I';H"1] of" PC's statements nhove, nil of which m: irreconcilably inconsistent with the notion that 
the modified custom trailer claimed by PC to have effected a "dramatic increase in. [its] annual. 
* •- v'nu\: ' ncvci a^iuaiiy OXISIJd. 
The recent depositions of the Belchers and Stain make crystal clear that the trailer 
Exhibr I - "a custom designed trailer thai gives [PC| the ahilin u* use our *()U ion .Tune as 
either a 3uo ; a< » : * • , , . . ,> i *' -! :•*! 
Exhibit l wonW nnvi> 10 In; modified su that it could earn, more wvighl because the 
counterweigh; ^.ed *.... ; .••. ton, crane are heir. *«.-< •.». . .. those used foi a 165 toi i ci ai le. 
[P. Belcher Depo pp ^ '>\ w> i~M 1 )?nr Rrlchcr testified that PC has only modified one trailer --
a 1996 Fontaine Hailci. which ^as modified through the adJiiuat. * . ..f\- „ A\\C ana -. .iin^u;^ n< 
axle spacing of the other two axles so that the trailer could carry .more weiphi | > > H< ^fur 
Depo pp 4 ;, 12] Dave Belcher also testified that the modified i onuune trailer could be used 
to carry counicruem.liis loi huifi tin- M±U ion an*!iil?:.lyjL. ••*-*•-' ,iJ* Belcher Depo,, pp.. 8-11] 
Vern Belcher testified that PC has built only one custom designed trailer — the 1996 Fontaine 
step deck trailei , which was purchased .March 9, 200.5. [V Belcher Depo, , pp. 5-6] and that the 
modifications added a third axle and changed axle spacing so that the trailer could carry more 
weight [V. Belcher Dej >o.? f -p 6 7]. S 'eiii. Belcher testified that the modifications to the Fontaine 
trailer were effected by PC before the trailer was taken to Premier Truck and Trailei •* ih *\ oi\ 
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on or about April 8, 2005 - that is, the modifications were effectuated between the purchase date 
of March 9 and April 8, 2005. [V. Belcher Depo., pp. 13-14, Ex. D] Stam testified that the 
modified Fontaine trailer could haul counterweights for both the 165-ton and 300-ton cranes, and 
that the modified Fontaine trailer was in fact used with counterweights for the 300-ton crane. 
[Stam Depo., pp. 8-9] 
So, the evidence is as follows: 
(1) Paul Belcher gave banking institutions a document stating that PC had 
significantly increased its revenues through collaboration between PC and Stam in 
designing and building a custom designed trailer which allowed the use of both a 165-ton 
and 300-ton crane configuration. That language makes absolutely clear that PC was 
stating that the modified trailer was in fact constructed because PC claimed that its 
construction allowed PC to increase its usage of the cranes. 
(2) PC only built one custom modified trailer - the 1996 Fontaine trailer that 
was modified between March and early April of 2005. That trailer was modified so that it 
could carry more weight. As Belchers and Stam testified, in order for a trailer to carry 
weights for either the 165-ton or 300-ton cranes, a trailer would have to carry more 
weight. The Fontaine was modified in exactly the way that PC testified a trailer would 
have to be modified to service both the 300-ton and 165-ton cranes, and it was in fact 
used with both the 165 and 300-ton cranes. 
There is no doubt that the trailer that Paul Belcher stated in Exhibit 1 to his lender was modified 
in collaboration with Stam was in fact the trailer that was modified in March and April, 2005. 
But PC had a problem - PC and PC's counsel had been maintaining in 
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correspondence with McQueen, responses to discovery, and statements to the Court that the 
modified trailei \ vas bi lilt in 2006 and was "ii relevant" becai ise it was outside the "rele > ant 
period", Because the only modified trailer was built squarely in the relevant time period — 
{ \ I J • • • i *• ^ M | 'i * < ty.* :^n\ -: •-• 
! <difled trailer was evei fnnU aHc- Decembei 31 ?0(r>. renders each objection to -;iscnverv 
baseless and each statei tieiit and suggestioi ' tnd "h IcQi ic en that the si ibject trailei 
existed or was modified in 2006 a falsehood Tlu* course ol events makes clear that tin*, was riot 
an innocent iui-Likv. it was a purpose n.L .;;^:i u, p:\ • . K .-.i/ii^.i./'iii L^o\a.!h nigi-r 
damaging evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 37(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes sanctions when, among other 
things, a party fails to obey the Court's order to provide discovery [Rule 37(b)(2)]; in addition, 
the I Itali Appellate Courts have held that Rule 37(d) "allows a court to impose sanctions against 
a party for disregarding discovery obligations even when that party has not directly violated, a 
C . • -:i< • * C-- ' ' . . * • * . V / . . i . - ' - ' . I - . ) , 1 - t . v , ( H P -' ' ' '* 
585 (UT App 1 °90) Sanctions are appropriate once the court limb; "wilfulness, bad fait! •* 
fi. .' • . • • « - • - i . :
 : .. . . • J , . - . : * • M . v . 
E.g., Mart*»// ' \mtinental Baking C V). ;MHP 2d 27 \ \ I 1 sK) • -u addition. Rule 2"ig) 
provides tl lat a la\ \ yer's signati u e on a discover} response 'constiti ites a certification that 
(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for tl ic 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) notinicipu^cdim au> uiipiuj^i puipu^., 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and 
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(3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive " 
The Court is presented with an egregious case of a party and its counsel (i) filing 
objections to discovery that are baseless if no trailer was modified (as they now claim), (ii) 
making patently false statements to opposing counsel concerning the existence and time frame of 
existence of the subject trailer, (iii) making patently false statements to the Court concerning the 
existence and time frame of existence of the subject trailer, and (iv) disobeying this Court's 
Order dated November 2, 2007, which required production of documents bearing upon the 
modified trailer. This is not the first time that PC and its counsel have engaged in this game-
playing approach to discovery; about two-thirds of the Court's file concerns this very problem. 
The Court has been extraordinarily patient with this behavior. This time, however, PC and its 
counsel have been caught red-handed, making false statements to the Court, to counsel, and 
intentionally obstructing discovery.1 Yes, those are offensive words. But they are regrettably 
accurate, based on PC and its counsel's very own words. 
What is the appropriate sanction? The only fair sanction is a dismissal with prejudice of 
PC's Complaint. How fair is it that PC should be allowed again and again to intentionally 
obfuscate and hide evidence that disproves its case and then, when caught red-handed, be 
allowed to escape with no penalty? This is one of many such instances in this case. The Courts 
have sustained the sanction for dismissal under far less egregious circumstances. E.g., Morton v. 
lThese behaviors are all not only violations of the U.R.C.P., but professional violations as 
well. Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct, precludes a lawyer from knowingly making any 
false statement of fact to a tribunal or failing to correct a false statement previously made. Rule 
3.4, Rules of Professional Conduct, precludes a lawyer from "obstructing] another party's access 
to evidence" and "fail[ing] to make reasonable diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 
discovery request by an opposing party." How can these duties be squared with Buxghardt's and 
Barneck's statements to McQueen's counsel and the Court that are outlined above? 
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Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (UT 1997) [wilful failure to comply with discovery order]; 
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P,2d 410 (UT 1964) [failure to produce records in response to 
order]; Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App. 127 [failure to produce records and obstruction of the 
discovery process]. PC's behavior has been dishonest and intentional, and has had the effect of 
(1) making McQueen's discovery largely ineffective and (2) extremely expensive. Enough is 
enough. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ 4 ~ day of June, 2008. 
c, Of Counsel 
/ADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SECOND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS was served this Q}\& day of June, 2008 by hand 
delivering on said date a copy thereof, addressed to: 
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq. 
Paul P. Burghardt, Esq. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
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